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Subcontracting represents a popular businessmodel in supply chains across industries.
In the case of hidden subcontracting, subcontractors are beyond the visible horizon of
the (focal) buying firm.Hence, buyersmust rely on a cascading effect for diffusing prac-
tices such as compliance with labor standards through their supply networks. Moti-
vated by the case of the Bangladeshi garment industry, we constructed an agent-based
model with buyers, first-tier suppliers, and subcontractors as agents in a supply net-
work in order to study the impact of network characteristics on the diffusion of labor
standards.Ourmodel followed a power-based diffusion rule that emphasized the coer-
cive power that buyers use to pressure their suppliers into adopting labor standards.
This rule is a key underlying assumption of compliance-based supplier management.
Hypotheses regarding power asymmetries through centrality and density of specific
network components, aswell as structural elements of thenetwork, such as complexity
and distance, were tested for different industry scenarios. Our analysis demonstrated
that network asymmetries have ample negative effects on the adoption of labor stan-
dards,whereas complexity plays aminor role.Moreover, the impact of the tested struc-
tural determinants for sustainability diffusion was found to be contingent on specific
industry types in the garment industry. This paper discusses its findings in light of pre-
vious research on subcontracting andmultitier supply chainmanagement. Among oth-
ers, we highlight how subcontracting increases horizontal complexity at each supply
chain tier, and how intermediaries such as sustainability nexus suppliers may crucially
affect the adoption of labor standards within industries.
KEYWORDS
agent-based modeling, network asymmetries, standard diffusion, subcontracting, supply net-
works, sustainable supply chainmanagement
1 INTRODUCTION
Subcontracting is prevalent in supply chains across various industries, but it has attracted little attention in the scholarly discourse as of yet. In the
case of hidden or unauthorized subcontracting, subcontractors are beyond the visible horizon of (focal) buying firms (Carter, Rogers, & Choi, 2015);
thismeans that buyers cannot directly control subcontractor operations (Huang, Song, & Swinney, 2017). At the same time, there is increasing pres-
sure on businesses to contribute to sustainability standards beyond factory gates or organizational boundaries and to assume responsibility for the
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conduct of the entire supply and demand chain (Arnold & Bowie, 2003; Blass & Corbett, 2018; Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). Customers and other
stakeholders make buyers accountable for labor rights violations and exploitative working conditions, such as child labor (Gomez-Paredes et al.,
2016) and forced or slave labor (Gold, Trautrims, & Trodd, 2015), no matter where in their supply networks they might occur (Gold & Heikkuri-
nen, 2018). This motivates focal buying firms to cascade labor standards throughout their supply networks. While there is some evidence that
this cascading effort often fails (Villena, 2019), there is generally limited knowledge about the mechanisms that spread labor standards through
supply networks.
Early research addressed the question of how sustainability-related management systems standards are diffused (e.g., Corbett & Kirsch, 2001).
Later on, the question of how sustainability spreads along supply chains and networks gained academic attention (e.g., Marshall, McCarthy, Claudy,
&McGrath, 2019), although studieson thediffusionof sustainability alongmultiple tiers of supply chains remain scant. Evenmore limited is research
that covers the phenomenon of subcontracting in supply networks (Caro, Lane, & Saez de Tejada Cuenca, 2019; LeBaron, 2018). This is astonish-
ing since subcontracting represents a highly relevant phenomenon in the goal of sustainability in supply networks; such practice may substantially
enhance complexity and blur the visible horizon of focal companies (Carter et al., 2015) even if only a few supply chain tiers are involved. Our study
examined supplier–subcontractor networks in which the buyers do not hold direct contractual relationships with (all) the companies that produce
their purchase. It employed an agent-based modeling approach with a diffusion mechanism based on an imbalance of power and the resulting net-
work asymmetries (Prado &Woodside, 2015) to analyze the effects of network centrality, density, complexity, and distance on the spread of labor
standards in such networks. Our study addressed the following research question: How do key structural network characteristics affect the diffu-
sion of labor standards from buyers throughout a supplier–subcontractor network?
We drew on the conceptualization of power and network characteristics to examine subcontracting in the Bangladeshi garment industry, as
describedbyLabowitz andBaumann-Pauly (2014) andCaroet al. (2019). These authors studied the sector and found that different formsof subcon-
tracting have long been essential features of this industry; they are particularly rooted in structural problems arising from exploitative pricing and
procurement practices (Alamgir &Banerjee, 2019) and lead to severe violations of labor standards. Even though focal firms have strived to improve
working conditions in supplier companies, for example, through supplier codesof conduct andauditing (Toffel, Short,&Ouellet, 2015;Villena, 2019),
hidden subcontracting in apparel supply networks makes it impossible for foreign buyers to track where—and under which conditions—products
are actually manufactured (Caro et al., 2019). Beyond the case of Bangladesh’s garment industry, subcontracting is a common business model in
supply chains across various industries. Focal buying companies themselves have given rise to high levels of subcontracting in labor-intensive sup-
ply chains as they havemoved to arm’s length contractual agreements with suppliers to cut costs and reduce legal ownership (LeBaron, 2014). This
gives rise to the question of how far corporate responsibility for labor conditions can be (re)extendedwithin supply networks.
Supporting the normative stance of industrial ecology research (Ehrenfeld, 2007), labor issues have recently entered the debate on life cycle
sustainability assessment (Wulf, Zapp, Schreiber, Marx & Schloer, 2017) under the label of “social life cycle assessment” (Kuehnen & Hahn, 2017).
An investigation of hydrogen production by advanced alkaline water electrolysis and its effects on working conditions, for instance, pointed to
adverse impacts on global upstream supply chain stages (Werker, Wulf & Zapp, 2019). The current study investigates the diffusion of labor stan-
dards through supply networks with a special focus on network characteristics and power. The remainder is structured as follows. The next section
addresses the diffusion of (social) sustainability in supply networks. After deriving hypotheses from the literature and presenting the diffusion
model, the results of four industry scenarios are reported and discussed. The conclusion points to the study’s limitations, directions for future
research, andmanagerial implications.
2 DIFFUSION OF SUSTAINABILITY ALONG SUPPLY NETWORKS
The question of how standards are diffused has gained scholarly attention in recent decades, particularly with regard to quality and environmental
management systems standards (Castka & Balzarova, 2008; Corbett, 2006; Corbett & Kirsch, 2001). Rosen, Beckman, and Bercovitz (2002) have
stressed that standards may help transaction cost reduction and effective goal attainment across companies if government regulation and other
shared norms are missing. While early studies have focused on the adoption of sustainability at the firm and sometimes at the supplier level (Rock,
Lim, & Angel, 2006), recent research interest has focused on sustainability diffusion in multitier supply chains (e.g., Grimm, Hofstetter, & Sarkis,
2014; Tachizawa & Wong, 2014; Wilhelm, Blome, Wieck, & Xiao, 2016) and supply networks (e.g., Moreno-Camacho, Montoya-Torres, & Jaegler,
2019; Villena &Gioia, 2020). However, research on the diffusion of sustainability along supply chains is still in its infancy and is dominated by quali-
tative and conceptual approaches; it only occasionally considers issues of supply network characteristics. For example,Wilhelm et al. (2016) identi-
fied supply chain complexity as an important and highly differentiated contingency factor of buying firms’ sub-supplier management. Furthermore,
Tachizawa andWong (2015) looked at supply network characteristics when analyzing conceptually how supply network complexity, centralization,
and density moderate the relationship between green supply chain governance and environmental performance.
While such conceptualizations assume symmetrical responses to governance mechanisms for standard adoption and non-adoption in the net-
work, causal asymmetrymight alter the conditions for thedisseminationof labor standards (Prado&Woodside, 2015). For instance, a highdegreeof
standard adoption already at the first-tier supplier level might represent a necessary but insufficient condition for a wider spread of the standard,
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depending on network configurations. Similarly, Ayuso, Roca, and Colome (2013) found evidence that customer-induced sustainability require-
ments are asymmetrically transmitted throughout the supply chain, with large buying companies imposing sustainable practices more strongly
than smaller companies. Although these kinds of size asymmetries do not comprehensively account for the barriers to standard diffusion in supply
networks, they provide a starting point for further model-based investigations.
Besides structural network characteristics, the concept of power (e.g., Cox, 1999; Cox, Sanderson, &Watson, 2001;Maloni & Benton, 2000) has
attracted substantial attention in buyer–supplier relationships, since previous studies have provided evidence that the focal firm’s power is crucial
for diffusing sustainability (e.g., Lee, Klassen, Furlan,&Vinelli, 2014).Grimm,Hofstetter, andSarkis (2016) found that sub-suppliermanagementwas
driven by public attention directed toward first-tier suppliers, risks of sub-suppliers’ misbehavior, and the focal company’s channel power. However,
power effects can contradict or even cause supply chain strategies and related governance mechanisms to backfire (Plambeck & Taylor, 2015).
Touboulic, Chicksand, andWalker (2014) showed that power imbalances can be leveraged to push sustainability practices through the supply chain,
at least in the short term. In the long run, however, the “use of buyer power on dependent suppliers creates resistance, which impairs the long-term
achievement of sustainability goals” (Touboulic et al., 2014, p. 604), and might be seen as impairing suppliers’ willingness to diffuse sustainability
standards further up the supply chain (see also Hall &Matos, 2010).
Building on this work, Marshall et al. (2019) investigated which types of power make first-tier suppliers adopt socially responsible procurement
practices. They found that it is indeed expert and referent power that foster the adoption; in contrast, not all forms of power that imply the direct
action of one party on another party (e.g., coercive, legitimate, and reward power) have positive effects on the adoption decisions. Therefore, buying
firms can enhance the chances that first-tier suppliers will engage in socially responsible procurement practices themselves if they provide respec-
tive expertise, training, and knowledge, as well as values and orientation toward sustainability, rather than bullying or bribing suppliers. Beyond the
assumptionof power to assure the compliance of supplierswith regard to labor standards, however, the diffusion of sustainability practices requires
accompanying commitment-orientedmeans such as joint problem-solving or information exchange to reach the full potential of private (voluntary)
regulation (Locke, Amengual, &Mangla, 2009). To promote diffusion of sustainability through supply networks, Villena (2019) aswell as Villena and
Gioia (2020) highlighted the strategic role of the buyer’s procurement function that has to engage with internal and external stakeholders as well
as directly with the supplier’s procurement unit.
We concede that the proposed conceptualization of power and network characteristics omitted the means of buyer engagement with and com-
mitment toward first-tier suppliers; this is a considerable limitation. Instead, our approach provided the foundation for amodel-based evaluation of
power-based interaction in supply networks. We only covered one form of power, namely, coercive relational power; our neglect of other forms of
power, such as referent and expert power, is also a limitation (Marshall et al., 2019). Our diffusionwas based on penalties, which could be conceived
as negative rewards (Porteous, Rammohan, & Lee, 2011), but not as voluntary measures (Rosen et al., 2002). We assumed that the governance of
suppliers based onmonitoring, control, and threats of penalties is a common form of supply chainmanagement (Lund-Thomsen& Lindgreen, 2014).
Recent literature has alsomore broadly explored the role and agency of various types of intermediaries in diffusing good labor practices through
international supply networks. Munir, Ayaz, Levy, and Willmott (2018) scrutinized how corporate, state, multilateral, and civil society actors have
served as intermediaries in global production network (GPN) governance.More closely related to our study’s focus, Soundararajan, Khan, and Tarba
(2018) highlight the role of sourcing agents as boundary spanners betweenWestern buyers and local suppliers who contribute to labor standards
in the Indian garment industry. Building on this, the present research studies, among other things, the role of first-tier suppliers as intermediaries to
diffuse labor standards from the focal buying company toward subcontractors.
3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Lee et al. (2014) stated that the stringency of sustainability requirements tends to increase as they pass upstream in the supply chain. Sustainability-
orientedorganizations are able to force their suppliers to change theirworking conditions if the balance of power in the supply relationship is tipped
in their favor. In this study, we conceived of power, in an overarching sense, as the ability of one party to impose its will over another party (cf., Emer-
son, 1962). Accordingly, good labor practices were driven by power and control in our model rather than mutual and voluntary intentions. Related
measures of power can be drawn from resource dependence theory, which explains how critical external resources influence organizational inter-
dependence and behavior (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman,Withers, & Collins, 2009). Both aspects of interdependence—power imbalance and
mutual dependence—can be found in the buyer–supplier relationship in procurement decisions. As most apparel companies today do not operate
their own production facilities but use external suppliers, this access to production capacity at the supplier stage is a crucial part of business suc-
cess. To acquire control over these supplier resources, buying firms increase suppliers’ dependence on them. In the apparel sector, there is usually
a rather persistent power imbalance in favor of the buyer with sufficient capacity available in the supply market; this also explains why resource
dependence does not lead to formal, permanent interorganizational arrangements but to a system of short-term contracts (Casciaro & Piskorski,
2005). Focal firms, accordingly, lose direct control when suppliers outsource (parts of) their assignment to subcontractors. This is particularly true
for hidden subcontracting as observed in Bangladesh’s garment industry (Padmanabhan, Baumann-Pauly, & Labowitz, 2015).
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According to resource dependence theory, firms purposefully try to increase the dependence of external business entities upon themselves or
decrease their own dependence upon external environments (Barringer &Harrison, 2000) (e.g., by taking amore central position in the supply net-
work). In this context, centrality can be defined as the extent to which overall connectedness is organized around particular nodes in a network
(Borgatti & Li, 2009). Accordingly, a highly central buying firm has more control over formal governance mechanisms, such as sustainability stan-
dards, auditing schemes, or codes of conduct, therebymaking it more difficult for suppliers and subcontractors to hide bad practices (Orsdemir, Hu,
&Deshpande, 2019). Proposing the concept of the nexus supplier, Yan, Choi, Kim, andYang (2015) argue that suppliers’ and subcontractors’ critical-
ity arise from their network position and interorganizational ties such that supplierswith high network centralitymight cause network asymmetries
and are therefore associated with more power. Network density can be seen as another form of power that is derived from network asymmetries.
Generally, network density can be defined as the number of total ties in the network compared to the number of potential ties (Borgatti & Li, 2009).
Kim, Choi, Yan, and Dooley (2011) assigned a higher density of the supplier network to a higher effort to manage it, in comparison to a loosely con-
nected supplier network. Strong, informal, and therefore hidden ties in supplier–subcontractor networks, such as in Bangladesh’s garment industry,
are accordingly assumed to cause power asymmetries between the buyer and (nexus) suppliers; this hinders standard diffusion from the buyer. In
this context, it is hypothesized that the higher the supplier–subcontractor centrality (SSC) or density compared to the buyer centrality or density,
the less likely the standard will be adopted. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1: Supplier–subcontractor centrality (SSC) negatively affects labor standard adoption in supply networks.
H2: Supplier–subcontractor density (SSDen) negatively affects labor standard adoption in supply networks.
Besides drawing on power-related arguments, the present study explicitly took a network perspective. Supplier–subcontractor networks may
feature high network complexity at the first-tier supplier stage, which the buyer must account for. Generally, complexity is understood as a multi-
dimensional construct that is a function of the number of network actors establishing different types of interrelationships (Choi & Krause, 2006;
Tachizawa &Wong, 2015). Organizational design literature distinguishes between horizontal complexity (number of suppliers), vertical complexity
(number of “jumps” in the network), and spatial complexity (geographical dispersion of suppliers) (Grimm et al., 2014). Nodes that are short path
lengths from other nodes in a network receive information sooner and more effectively than distant nodes (Borgatti & Li, 2009). Long, fragmented
supply chains have often been linked to the difficulties of spreading sustainability and labor standards (Alsamawi, Murray, & Lenzen, 2014; Mena,
Humphries, & Choi, 2013). Following the concept of the double agency role (Wilhelm et al., 2016), first-tier suppliers have to act as intermediaries
to ensure that subcontractors comply with the requirements of sustainability standards under conditions of a limited visible horizon of buyers. Fol-
lowing the previous arguments, we used the number of nodes in the supply network (“horizontal complexity”), the number of jumps (“vertical com-
plexity”), and the average path lengthwithin the supplier–subcontractor network (“supply network distance”) as proxies for complexity to study the
diffusion of power and adoption of standards. Thus, we assumed that complexity increaseswith the size and distance of the supplier–subcontractor
network, thereby hindering the diffusion of labor standards through a supply network. Accordingly, the following hypotheses were formulated:
H3: Horizontal complexity (HC) negatively affects labor standard adoption in supplier–subcontractor networks.
H4: Vertical complexity (VC) negatively affects labor standard adoption in supplier–subcontractor networks.
H5: Supply network distance (SNDist) negatively affects labor standard adoption in supplier–subcontractor networks.
4 DIFFUSION MODEL
In this section, we present a stylized network-based supplier–subcontractor model. The idea of viewing supply chains and supplier–subcontractor
relationships as complex networks is well established (Basole & Bellamy, 2014; Blass & Corbett, 2018). Business units are modeled as nodes (ver-
tices) with connections (edges) representing supply network relationships in a graph G(V, E), where V indicates the vector of tiers (jumps) and E is
the set of links among nodes (factories) in the graph. Connections are directional as they represent goods and services being sold by one business to
another. Edgeweights are used to represent the value of the pieces (garments) being traded. In contrast to othermodeling approaches, agent-based
modeling takes advantage of its ability tomodel complex, decentralized systemswith heterogeneous, localized decision-making in a network struc-
ture where each actor makes its own independent decision instead of following a top-down hierarchy (Serova, 2013). This more accurately reflects
the reality of contemporary supplier and subcontractormanagement (Blass &Corbett, 2018) and avoids the simplifications that are usually needed
whenmathematical modeling is used tomake equations tractable (Borrill & Tesfatsion, 2011).
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4.1 Building the supply network
Sun andWu (2005) reported that graphs have the following characteristics in building a supply network: preferential attachment and robustness.
To achieve these, many papers applying computational methods such as simulation or analytical approaches used off-the-shelf network models to
act as their supply network. Nair and Vidal (2011), for example, combined a preferential attachment model and a random model. To create their
model, they added nodes to the network, connecting each new node to existing nodes with a probability that was proportional to the number of
connections that the existing nodes already had. This is the standard procedure for creating such networks. Xuan,Du, Li, andWu (2010) also built on
this approach by adding overarching growth rules about when new products were created using the existing products and rawmaterials. However,
we did not use such overarching rules–or a God’s eye view–to guide preferential attachment. Our network structures were specifically created in
the agent modeling environment NetLogo (version 6.0.1); the NetLogo code is given in the supplementarymaterial.
Our network building approach was run in different steps. First, a number of buyers, large supplier factories, and small subcontractor factories
were instantiated. The initial numbers of each were varied to depict specific industry scenarios (see Section 4.4). Second, large and small factories
were differentiated by capacity, allowing large factories to accept orders up to 10 times their capacity, while small factories could not subcontract.
Small factories were not allowed to accept orders beyond their capacity due to the visibility of their capacity limitations. Moreover, small factories
wouldnotbe consideredby large international buyers in the first place, since theydonothave the capabilities topassbasic compliance checks. Third,
buyers were told how many orders to place. The number and size of the orders did not change once the scenario was set. Buyers then contacted
large factories at random to ask whether they could supply. In the last step, large factories tried to subcontract and fulfill the orders they had
accepted by asking other factories, large or small, to supply them. The factories then fulfilled their orders and passed their goods along the network.
If the factories stayed within capacity and did not subcontract, the supply chain network stayed bipartite. If subcontracting was pursued, complex
networks were created as the amount that the buyer ordered increased. In this way, a supply network was simulated based on subcontracting, as
described by Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly (2014) as well as Caro et al. (2019).
4.2 Diffusion mechanism
After the supply networks were set, the diffusion mechanism was run. The diffusion mechanism involved one randomly selected buyer trying to
force labor standards through to its first-tier suppliers and their respective subcontractors. Themechanism succeeded if the balance of power was
tipped in its favor. Then, any factories that adopted the standards would try to force the factories that supply them to adopt the standards. This
continued until all agents that could potentially adopt the standards had been given the chance to do so. Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) posited that
power relations in a supply chain dyad call for the simultaneous consideration of the power capability of node i in relation to node j, in addition to the
power capability of node j in relation to node i. Therefore, our mechanism of diffusion can be described as follows: if it is desired, a buyer i can force









wherewji is the value of goods or services that flow from j into i, Σw→i is the total value that flows into i, and Σwj→ is the total value that flows out of
j. Given this, node jwill adopt the standards if a relationship it has to any node i is such that:
Vij < Vji
and node i has already been adopted1. More plainly, a buyer can force a first-tier supplier or a first-tier supplier can force a subcontractor to adopt
the standards if the value of the goods or services that flow between them is a smaller ratio of total business for the buying firm than for the
supplying or subcontracted firm.
Figure 1 shows a simple example of this mechanism with two unweighted networks. In the network on the left, node 6 wants to push labor
standards onto its first-tier suppliers and subcontractors. If every edge is given, and the weight = 1, then the in-neighbors of node 6 will adopt the
1 Weuse> rather than≥ as our assumption is that factorieswill be reluctant to adopt labor standards and the default positionwill be to resist. Theywill only adopt if they have less power than their
buyer; if they are equally powerful, they will not.


















F IGURE 1 Illustration diffusionmechanismwith unweighted networks (edgeweights are set to be 1). In the panel on the left, Node 6 is the




















F IGURE 2 Illustration diffusionmechanismwith weighted networks. If buyer B1wants to force labor standards through the supply chain with
the weights on the left, all factories will adopt them; however, with the weights on the right, none will. Taking the relationship between buyer B1












standards if their out-degree is less than three. Applying this rule, node 1 will adopt the standards. In the second time period, the in-neighbors of
node 1will adopt the standards if their out-degree is less than five, so nodes 3, 4, 2, and 9will now adopt the standards. In the network on the right,
node 7 is trying to get its suppliers to adopt the standards; they will if their out-degree is less than three. Node 2, therefore, adopts the standards in
the first time period. Node 9 adopts the standards in the second time period. The complexity of this diffusion rises when edgeweights are included.
This can be seen in Figure 2, where every factory in the left panel will adopt the standards if buyer B1 tries to push them through; however, in the
panel on the right, none will.
The implication is that if tier-1 industry weights are similar in size, it is better, in terms of diffusion, for a buyer to have more suppliers. If a buyer
must use a dominant supplier andwishes to improve its supply network, it must reduce its reliance on the dominant partner with other suppliers to
push through change. For diffusion to occur, the node that is trying to push through labor standards must have two or more suppliers, regardless of
the value (edgeweight) that each of them supplies. There is no corollary for this; a factory does not need at least two buyers in order to resist having
to pay for the implementation of labor standards.
4.3 Hypotheses testing
To test the proposed hypotheses, power imbalances and dependencies were simulated in the agent-based model and assessed through multiple
simulation runs (1,000 times for each industry scenario). We defined the independent variables (i.e., horizontal and vertical complexity and supply
network distance, as well as supplier--subcontractor centrality and supplier--subcontractor density) to explain the standard adoption rate of the
subsequent linear regressionmodel (see Table 1); therefore, we used the statistics software package R.
AR = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1SSC + 𝛼2SSDen + 𝛼3HC + 𝛼4VC + 𝛼5SNDist.
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TABLE 1 Model variables
Variables Meaning in network science, taken fromNewman (2010) Meaning in the current garment industry context
Adoption rate, AR AR is the dependent variable and the ratio of actual nodes that
have adopted the standards, denoted by the number of adopters
divided by the total number of network nodes





SSC is the average number of connections within the supply
network denoted by themean node degree (e.g., if there are 10
nodes, and one node has five connections, this is averagedwith
the number of connections that the other nine have)
The average number of players each player interacts
with. In this context, the number of links can impact




SSDen is the average ratio of actual connections to potential
connections in the supply network, denoted by themean of the
ratio of the number of edges to the number of possible edges
(e.g., if there are five nodes, they can have four potential
connections.When the network realizes two connections, the
density can be calculated as 2/4)
This gives an indication of the ratio of actual interaction
with other players to the potential interaction
Horizontal
complexity,HC
HC is assessable through the number of nodes in the supply
network
Number of actors in the industry
Vertical complexity,
VC
VC is assessable through the number of “jumps” in the supply
network, denoted by themean path length between one chosen
node and all other nodes (e.g., if there are 10 nodes in the supply
network, the average pairs between those 10 and the buyer are
taken)
Measure of access that the buyer has to its supply
network, equivalent to supply chain tiers. If this is 1
then the buyer knows all the suppliers. A value




SNDist is assessable by the average path length within the supply
network, denoted by themean of the shortest path length
averaged over all pairs of nodes (e.g., if there are 10 nodes, the
average pairs between the 10 are taken)
Same as VC, but for all actors or players in the industry,
not just the buyer, i.e., agents and othermiddlemen
4.4 Scenario analysis
The apparel industry hasworld-wide exports of over $550 billion to consumermarkets around theworld (WTO, 2019), featuring broad diversity. To
examine the impact of this diversity on our results, we introduced variety into the shape of the supply networks that were tested. To achieve this,
we grewnetworks froma series of scenarios. Startingwith a baseline scenario (subcontractingwas allowed and therewas just one buyer), networks
with the required structural characteristicswere created as the amount that the single buyer ordered increased (see Table S1-1 in Supporting Infor-
mation). Accordingly, a scenario analysis was carried out, varying the size of the buyer’s orders, as well as the number and size of the large factories.
In each scenario, there was sufficient capacity available through subcontracting to an ample number of small factories. In sum, four industry types
were examined to test our hypotheses:
Scenario 1 (mass-customizedproductswith higher-quality requirements) featuredmany large factories and a limited number of buyers,with each
buyer placing large orders. Specifically, there were 100 large factories and two buyers; each buyer placed five orders of 200 units. Scenario 1 is
illustrated by global (sports/lifestyle) brands, placing large orders for goods that are the same all over the world.
Scenario 2 (simple products with lower-quality requirements) featuredmany large factories andmany buyers, each placing small orders. Specifi-
cally, therewere 100 large factories and 20 buyers; each buyer placed four orders of 70 units. Scenario 2 suggests large buyers such as supermar-
kets ordering standard products such as white tee-shirts, which are simpler to produce than the goods in Scenario 1.
Scenario 3 (complex productswith high-quality requirements) featured few large factories and fewbuyers placing large orders. Specifically, there
were five large factories and two buyers; each buyer placed five orders of 200 units. Scenario 3 involves more complex products that are usually
stocked by larger fashion retailers, for example, clothing that requires a feature such as a brass buckle.
Scenario 4 (small batch production of boutique products) featured few large factories and many buyers placing small orders. Specifically, there
were five large factories and 20 buyers; each buyer placed four orders of 70 units. Scenario 4 involves boutique buyerswho sell smaller quantities
than scenario 3 because of the exclusivity of the product. Due to the small batch size, there are only a few factories willing to take on these types
of orders.
The values that we chose to set up and distinguish our four scenarios are meant to be illustrative of the various types of buyers and suppliers.
The numbers are not meant to represent single items but should be interpreted as an item being a unit of choice. We used the scenarios purely to
create supply networks with variance in their characteristics (see Table 1). The numbers we chose have sufficient variance to create distinguishing
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TABLE 2 Synthesized results
Scenario H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
1 Accepted Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected
2 No support Accepted Rejected Accepted No support
3 No support Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected
4 No adoption No adoption No adoption No adoption No adoption
TABLE 3 Regressing adoption rate on independent variables in industry scenario 1 (n= 1,000)
Variables Regression coefficient Std. error t value Pr(> |t|)
SSC −66.9134 7.1753 −9.33 0.0000***
SSDen −85.2688 7.1479 −11.93 0.0000***
HC 0.7685 0.0307 25.06 0.0000***
VC −12.5152 0.5131 −24.39 0.0000***
SNDist 5.7826 0.9338 6.19 0.0000***
Note: ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
scenarios and are at the same time comfortably within the variety that can be found in Bangladesh’s garment industry as extracted from WTO
(2019). Gray information sources in the industry, such as Segura (2019) and Jones (2017), describe segmentations of clothing brands that are similar
to our scenarios.
5 RESULTS
Adoption of standards took place in industry scenarios 1, 2, and 3; no adoption of standards took place in industry scenario 4, which represents the
most homogeneous network. This confirms that standard diffusion is dependent on structural imbalances of power. In line with other agent-based
models, we relied on the sign of a coefficient and its size relative to that of the other variables to draw conclusions. Table 2 synthesizes the results
with regard to the proposed hypotheses, while the detailed results of the regression analysis for industry scenarios 1, 2, and 3 are presented in
Tables 3–5, respectively. Boxplots for each scenario are shown in Figures S1-1–S1-3 in Supporting Information.
TABLE 4 Regressing adoption rate on independent variables in industry scenario 2 (n= 1,000)
Variables Regression coefficient Std. error t value Pr(> |t|)
SSC −0.4917 2.1092 −0.23 0.8157
SSDen −21.2711 1.2376 −17.19 0.0000***
HC 0.1461 0.0127 11.52 0.0000***
VC −2.6690 0.1783 −14.97 0.0000***
SNDist 0.8359 0.5351 1.56 0.1186
Note: ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
TABLE 5 Regressing adoption rate on independent variables in industry scenario 3 (n= 1,000)
Variables Regression coefficient Std. error t value Pr(>|t|)
SSC −143.4336 97.2187 −1.48 0.1405
SSDen −623.8607 62.0760 −10.05 0.0000***
HC 0.8768 0.0459 19.10 0.0000***
VC −46.2532 1.4387 −32.15 0.0000***
SNDist 12.1481 5.1217 2.37 0.0179**
Note: ***, **, * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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According to the results of the linear regression model, supplier--subcontractor centrality consistently had a negative effect on standard adop-
tion in supply networks, although the results were only statistically significant for industry scenario 1. Accordingly, H1 can be accepted for industry
scenario 1; this implies that a central position of the supplier–subcontractor network tends to support resistance against labor standard diffusion.
In comparison, SSDen had a stronger negative effect on standard adoption in supply networks, with varying effect sizes across industry scenarios,
suggesting that H2 can be accepted. In other words, the less densely connected the supplier–subcontractor network, themore the labor standards
were likely to spread.
Regardingmeasures of network complexity, horizontal complexity appears to have a positive (although very small) effect on standard adoption in
supplier–subcontractor networks, whichmeans that H3 is rejected. Furthermore, vertical complexity appears to have a negative effect on standard
adoption in supplier–subcontractor networks, which means that H4 can be accepted. This negative effect was considerable but still rather small
compared to themeasures of network asymmetry, namely, supplier--subcontractor centrality and density. In addition, our analysis yielded compar-
atively small positive effects of supply network distance on the diffusion of labor standards for industry scenarios 1 and 3, whereas no statistically
significant effect could be measured for scenario 2. Therefore, H5 could not be confirmed for industry scenario 2 and is rejected for industry sce-
narios 1 and 3. As a consequence, the more interconnected the supplier and the subcontractors, the harder it was to diffuse standard adoption.
With regard to the proposed three complexity measures, our findings suggested that only vertical complexity negatively affects standard adoption
in supply networks.
Generally, the observed network asymmetry measures yielded stronger negative effects on standard adoption compared to the proposed net-
work complexity measures. Summarizing the results, a high level of proximity and interconnectedness within the supplier–subcontractor network
hampered standard diffusion and shifted the power ratio in favor of the supplier–subcontractor network. Furthermore, it can be seen that an exces-
sive degree of homogeneity prevented diffusion (scenario 4) while strong (power) imbalances supported diffusion (scenario 3) to a certain extent.
6 DISCUSSION
Our analysis demonstrates that the diffusion of labor standards from buyers throughout supplier–subcontractor networks is complex and contin-
gent on industry structures (see industry scenarios 1–4), even when a simple diffusion rule based on power is applied. As a result, no diffusion of
labor standards based on the modeled power mechanisms took place within the industry scenario characterized by a limited number of large first-
tier suppliers anda largenumberof buyers placing small orders. This shows that small- andmedium-sized companies donot exert sufficient power to
make suppliers adopt labor standards; this reflects insights from survey research by Ayuso et al. (2013), who found that larger businesses aremore
effective in imposing their sustainability requirements on their business partners. Consequently, small- andmedium-sized buying companies either
have to rely on other diffusion mechanisms, for example, spreading a common moral vision (Marshall et al., 2019), building commitment through
collaboration (Locke et al., 2009), engagement with the suppliers’ procurement department (Villena, 2019), forging cooperatives with like-minded
peers to demand better working conditions in supplier factories (Mikkelsen & Arlbjoern, 2015), or on direct sourcing that bypasses big factories in
order to enforce decent labor standardswith smaller suppliers (e.g., Jaffee, Kloppenburg, &Monroy, 2004; Huang et al., 2017). However, in the case
of the Indian garment industry, Soundararajan et al. (2018) found evidence that foreign companies typically do not hold sufficient local knowledge
to effectively deal with suppliers directly but need sourcing agents as intermediaries to improve poor working conditions in their supply chains.
Considering the level of network asymmetries, the study results point to central and dense network structures among suppliers and subcon-
tractors as opportunities in which to hide suppliers’ and subcontractors’ bad labor practices; examples include showroom factories dedicated to
auditing visits (Labowitz & Baumann-Pauly, 2014; Orsdemir et al., 2019), leading buyers to believe in good labor standards, or making it easy for
them to claim ignorance (Caro et al., 2019). In fact, supplier--subcontractor centrality and supplier--subcontractor density representmuch stronger
obstacles to social standard adoption than network complexity, which has often been blamed for unsustainable upstream suppliers in the literature
(e.g., Alsamawi et al., 2014). In line with this, supplier–subcontractor networks that feature high centrality and density take over a “gatekeeping”
function and act as pivots for the diffusion of labor standards (Kim et al., 2011).
Almost no research touches upon the phenomenon of hidden or unauthorized subcontracting in supply networks (Caro et al., 2014; LeBaron,
2019), which is the focus of the current study. The principal commonality betweenmultitier supply chains and supplier–subcontractor networks for
the purpose of the study is that neither buyer has direct contractual relationshipswith (all) itsmanufacturers, thereby restricting the visible horizon
of the focal buying firm. Although the perspectives on multitier supply chains and supplier–subcontractor networks overlap, their implications on
the visible horizon of the buyer differ (Carter et al., 2015).While the extant literature onmultitier supply chainmanagement assumes that first-tier
suppliers belong to the visible proportion of the supply base (e.g., Tachizawa & Wong, 2014), the horizontal complexity encountered in first-tier
supplier–subcontractor networks in the case of hidden subcontracting confines the visible horizon of the buying firm, and thus precludes direct
monitoring and control of subcontractors already at this tier. As suppliers and subcontractors can resist standard diffusion, in particular in central
and dense supplier–subcontractor networks, purely power-based diffusion mechanisms are not likely to be effective (cf., Touboulic et al., 2014;
Marshall et al., 2019). Summarizing the findings of the present study, the logic of subcontracting may complement and enrich the literature stream
on multitier supply chains by adding additional layers of complexity and asymmetries. While we only looked at subcontracting in one supply chain
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tier, it could easily be the case that subcontracting, that is, the horizontal expansion of supply chain tiers, happens at various tiers or stages, yielding
a highly complex picture.
Applying the theory of the nexus supplier (Yan et al., 2015), subcontractors are structurally and relationally embedded in the buyer’s supply net-
work beyond direct ties. This means that the buyer has to rely on cascading labor standards via the first-tier supplier (Villena, 2019), thus assigning
a double agency role (Wilhelm et al., 2016) to this critical actor in the diffusion process, especially if it holds a central position in the supplier–
subcontractor network. This observation may suggest extending the typology proposed by Yan et al. (2015) comprising operational, monopolistic,
and informational nexus suppliers to the type of sustainability nexus supplier that is critical for cascading sustainability standards through supply
networks. Sustainability nexus suppliersmay drive diffusion of labor standards through supplier–subcontractor networks, for example, by acting as
boundary spanners between buyers and subcontractors that feature high institutional and cultural distance (Soundararajan et al., 2018).
From a methodological angle, agent-based models allow researchers to create situations—in our case, social situations—and repeatedly exper-
iment on them in ways that would be more difficult, expensive, or even impossible in a social science lab. The agent-based model itself becomes
a realization of theory, more precise than any description in a spoken language, that can be used to explain the behaviors that emerge (Epstein &
Axtell, 1996); in our case, these are decisions about adopting labor standards. Accordingly, agent-based approaches can be used as a methodology
for theory development, especially when empirical data collection is difficult, costly, or ethically problematic. If empirical data is available, related
findings may be triangulated by findings frommodel-based research, beyondmodel calibration and validation; such data andmethodological trian-
gulation (Denzin, 1978) may help to build amore comprehensive, precise theory (Jick, 1979).
7 CONCLUSION
Our agent-basedmodeling approach for analyzing the impact of network characteristics on the diffusion of labor standards does not comewithout
limitations; these could be addressed by future research.While we investigated this research question for the case of a simple diffusionmechanism
based on coercive power, we acknowledge there are other forms of power, such as referent and expert power (Marshall et al., 2019), and that
buyer domination (Cox et al., 2001) in supplier–subcontractor networks is not ubiquitous, although it was prevalent in our case of garment sourcing
from Bangladesh. Furthermore, we are aware there is an important and diversified body of literature that goes beyond the somewhat simplistic
explanation of (social) sustainability diffusion in supply networks through themere exertion of power. Those studies indicate that collaboration (e.g.,
Vachon&Klassen, 2006), commitment (Locke et al., 2009), trust (e.g., Peters, Hofstetter, &Hoffmann, 2011), supportive organizational culture (e.g.,
Carter &Rogers, 2008), sustainability-related capabilities (e.g., Lu, Potter, Sanchez Rodrigues, &Walker, 2018), or business opportunities (e.g., Caro
et al., 2019) are drivers for increased sustainability in supply chains. Accordingly, the exclusive application of resource dependence theory reaches
its limits and points to complementary theoretical lenses for future research, such as autonomousmoral reasoning or sociopsychological norms.
The model further neglects the costs of switching suppliers and adopting labor standards (e.g., paying minimum and living wages) by assum-
ing that all factories realize sufficient profits that allow for such a change in remuneration policy. We therefore omitted the case in which buyers
are indirectly responsible for labor rights violations in their supplier–subcontractor networks in that their purchasing patterns exploit “inequali-
ties in the global workplace” (Alsamawi et al., 2014, p. 69), and excessively squeeze suppliers for prices while they simultaneously demand better
labor conditions (New, 2015). Accordingly, suppliers may feel pushed into providing low remuneration for shop floor workers or subcontracting to
noncompliant factories or household enterprises that use child labor (Gomez-Paredes et al., 2016). Follow-up research may delve into intraorgani-
zational inconsistencies and power struggles of focal buying firms in which Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities create a human facade
while purchasing policies exploit vulnerable suppliers (Lund-Thomsen & Lindgreen, 2014; Villena, 2019; Villena & Gioia, 2020). Other avenues of
future research could investigate modeling different forms of power exerted on suppliers (Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung, 2008), and their effects on
the behavior of these suppliers toward upstream suppliers or subcontractors (Marshall et al., 2019). Furthermore, the currentmodel could be trans-
ferred and adapted to other sectors, such as the electronics industry, where a supply basewith ample capacity could be distinguished from a supply
base with scarce capacity, particularly when specialized knowledge and advanced technologies are required.
Managers of buying companies that are focal points within their supply chains should be aware that the densely interconnected production
capacity of suppliers impedes thediffusionof sustainability standardsupstream in supply chains basedon coercivepower. In those cases, purchasing
managers may consider the complimentary use of other forms of power, such as referent and expert power, to create capabilities and a common
vision of sustainable work practice throughout the supply chain. The degree of discretion focal buyers have in disseminating labor standards, such
as through supplier development and supply chain redesign, comes with the moral obligation of improving the working conditions of vulnerable
labor forces in emerging and developing countries (Arnold & Bowie, 2003).
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